A characterization of equilibrium set of persuasion games with binary actions
Year of publication: |
2014
|
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Authors: | Miura, Shintaro |
Published in: |
Journal of mathematical economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0304-4068, ZDB-ID 217625-7. - Vol. 51.2014, p. 55-68
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Subject: | Persuasion game | Fully certifiable state | Binary actions of the receiver | No full disclosure equilibrium | Set of equilibria | Gleichgewichtstheorie | Equilibrium theory | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Gleichgewichtsmodell | Equilibrium model | Nichtkooperatives Spiel | Noncooperative game |
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