A characterization of equilibrium set of persuasion games with binary actions
Shintaro Miura
| Year of publication: |
2014
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Miura, Shintaro |
| Published in: |
Journal of mathematical economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0304-4068, ZDB-ID 217625-7. - Vol. 51.2014, p. 55-68
|
| Subject: | Persuasion game | Fully certifiable state | Binary actions of the receiver | No full disclosure equilibrium | Set of equilibria | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Gleichgewichtstheorie | Equilibrium theory | Gleichgewichtsmodell | Equilibrium model | Nichtkooperatives Spiel | Noncooperative game | Stabilität eines Gleichgewichts | Stability of equilibrium | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information |
| Extent: | graph. Darst. |
|---|---|
| Type of publication: | Article |
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010478582