A general characterization of interim efficient mechanisms for independent linear environments
Year of publication: |
2003-11
|
---|---|
Authors: | Ledyard, John ; Palfrey, Thomas |
Institutions: | California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences |
Subject: | public goods | mechanism design | interim efficiency | incentive compatibility | private values |
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