A Matching Model with Wage Announcement
I study a matching model where heterogeneous firms publicly announce wage offers. A Walrasian type of equilibrium is derived, and the concept of stability used to restrict the set of equilibria. It is shown that the equilibrium is always separable, with high productivity firms announcing strictly higher wages than low productivity firms. Furthermore, it is shown that the equilibrium is constrained efficient.
Year of publication: |
1995-04
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Authors: | Moen, Espen R. |
Institutions: | Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE |
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