A mechanism design approach to allocating central government funds among regional development agencies
Year of publication: |
2014
|
---|---|
Authors: | Kıbrıs, Özgür ; Tapkı, İpek |
Published in: |
Review of Economic Design. - Springer. - Vol. 18.2014, 3, p. 163-189
|
Publisher: |
Springer |
Subject: | Regional development agencies | Uniform mechanism | Efficiency | Strategy proofness | Fairness | Single peakedness |
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