A non-cooperative bargaining theory with incomplete information : verifiable types
Year of publication: |
May 2016
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Authors: | Okada, Akira |
Published in: |
Journal of economic theory. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531, ZDB-ID 410539-4. - Vol. 163.2016, p. 318-341
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Subject: | Bayesian bargaining problem | Incomplete information | Mechanism selection | Ex post Nash bargaining solution | Non-cooperative games | Unvollkommene Information | Nichtkooperatives Spiel | Noncooperative game | Verhandlungstheorie | Bargaining theory | Signalling | Tauschwirtschaft | Barter economy | Core |
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