A NOTE ON DISCRETE BID FIRST-PRICE AUCTION WITH GENERAL VALUE DISTRIBUTION

This paper evaluates the discrete bid first-price sealed-bid (FPSB) auction in a model with a general value distribution. We show that a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium exists for the discrete bid FPSB auction. We further prove that the discrete bid FPSB equilibrium conditionally converges to that of a continuous bid FPSB auction.

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Year of publication:	2010
Authors:	GANGSHU (GEORGE) CAI ; WURMAN, PETER R. ; GONG, XITING
Published in:	International Game Theory Review (IGTR). - World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., ISSN 1793-6675. - Vol. 12.2010, 01, p. 75-81
Publisher:	World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.
Subject:	First-price sealed-bid auction \| discrete bid \| Bayesian Nash equilibrium

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Extent:	application/pdf text/html
Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	B4 - Economic Methodology ; C0 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods. General ; C6 - Mathematical Methods and Programming ; C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory ; D5 - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium ; D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making ; M2 - Business Economics
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008455306