A note on firms' strategic behaviour during an IPO

Pia Weiß; Stefan Mai

When potential shareholders cannot observe the business conditions of the firms, the latter desiring to acquire capital by an IPO and operating under less favourable business conditions have a strong incentive to appear more successful. -- IPO ; asymmetric information ; signalling game

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Year of publication:	28. Nov. 2001
Other Persons:	Weiss, Pia (contributor) ; Mai, Stefan (contributor)
Publisher:	Köln : Inst. für Wirtschaftspolitik an der Univ. Köln
Subject:	Börsengang \| Initial public offering \| Asymmetrische Information \| Asymmetric information \| Signalling \| Unternehmenserfolg \| Firm performance \| Theorie \| Theory

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Extent:	Online-Ressource, 8 p., text
Series:	IWP discussion papers. - Köln : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ZDB-ID 2134362-7. - Vol. 2002,1
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature ; Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Systemvoraussetzungen: Acrobat reader
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/39247 [Handle]
Classification:	D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001906782