A note on Peters and Severinov, “Competition among sellers who offer auctions instead of prices”

We consider a market in which sellers compete for buyers by advertising reserve prices for second-price auctions. Applying the limit equilibrium concept developed in Peters and Severinov (1997) [1], we show that the competitive matching equilibrium is characterized by a reserve price of zero. This corrects a result in Peters and Severinov (1997) [1].

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2012
Authors:	Albrecht, James ; Gautier, Pieter ; Vroman, Susan
Published in:	Journal of Economic Theory. - Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531. - Vol. 147.2012, 1, p. 389-392
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Competing auctions \| Directed search

Online Resource

Check full text access |

More access options

Check Google Scholar

In libraries world-wide (WorldCat)

In German libraries (KVK)

subito order

I need help

More details

Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	D44 - Auctions ; D83 - Search, Learning, Information and Knowledge
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011042940