A note on reciprocity and modified dictator games

This note presents results from modified dictator games in which the payoff-relevant game is either chosen randomly or by the recipients. We do not observe reciprocal behavior when recipients choose the game: Dictators do not condition their donations on the game chosen by recipients.

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Year of publication:	2013
Authors:	Heinrich, Timo ; Weimann, Joachim
Published in:	Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 121.2013, 2, p. 202-205
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Modified dictator games \| Reciprocity \| Laboratory experiments

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	C70 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. General ; C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior ; D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010709095