A Note on the α- and β-Cores in TU Coalitional Strategic Games
We show that the dominant punishment strategy and coalitionally dominant strategy applied to TU coalitional strategic games give directly the saddle point expression for the coalitional aggregate payoff function, which is the condition for the equivalence of the strategic cores α and β. Also, we find that the existence of a saddle point together with the concavity of payoff functions is not sufficient for nonemptiness of the β-core.
Year of publication: |
2011
|
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Authors: | Chaowen, Yu ; Nakayama, Mikio |
Institutions: | Faculty of Economics, Keio University |
Saved in:
freely available
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