A Theory of Voting Patterns and Performance in Private and Public Committees
We analyze voting in private and public committees whose members care about the selected decision and the rewards which outsiders pay for representing their interests. If the agenda is binary or outsiders are symmetric then a private committee reaches decisions which better serve organizational goals than either a public committee or a randomly chosen committee member; whereas symmetric outsiders are best served by a public committee. The voting patterns of both private and public committees may fail Duverger’s Law, but they both satisfy a weaker condition: Dissidents in private [resp. public] committees all vote decisions which better [resp. worse] serve organizational goals than the plurality decision; so single-peakedness implies that all dissents lie on one side of the plurality decision.
Year of publication: |
2009-03
|
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Authors: | Seidmann, Daniel J. |
Institutions: | Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx), School of Economics |
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