Adverse Selection, Moral Hazard and the Demand for Medigap Insurance
Year of publication: |
2012-10-23
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Authors: | Keane, Michael ; Stavrunova, Olena |
Institutions: | Department of Economics, Oxford University |
Subject: | Health insurance | adverse selection | moral hazard | health care expenditure |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Notes: | Number 2012-W10 |
Classification: | i13 ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; C34 - Truncated and Censored Models ; C35 - Discrete Regression and Qualitative Choice Models |
Source: |
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Adverse Selection, Moral Hazard and the Demand for Medigap Insurance
Keane, Michael, (2011)
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Adverse Selection, Moral Hazard and the Demand for Medigap Insurance
Keane, Michael P., (2012)
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Adverse Selection, Moral Hazard and the Demand for Medigap Insurance
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