All Mixed Strategy Equilibria are Monotone Pure Strategy Equilibria in Asymmetric First-Price Auctions

Every mixed strategy equilibrium is outcome equivalent to a monotone pure strategy equilibrium in asymmetric first-price auctions in which n bidders have affiliated, one-dimensional, atomless types and interdependent values

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Year of publication:	2002
Authors:	McAdams, David
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Auktionstheorie \| Auction theory \| Nash-Gleichgewicht \| Nash equilibrium \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory \| Nichtkooperatives Spiel \| Noncooperative game \| Asymmetrische Information \| Asymmetric information

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (14 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments August 2002 erstellt
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

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