Allocation of objects with conditional property rights

This paper considers the allocation of indivisible goods among members of a collective assuming that individuals are given the right to retain certain goods when some individuals alter the allocation problem. The assignment of rights is exhaustive in that, for every good x, either individual i can exercise a right over x against j or j against i. It is shown that the only Pareto efficient allocation rules satisfying these requirements are those having a hierarchy of diarchies.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2009-12-20
Authors:	Quesada, Antonio
Institutions:	Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
Subject:	Allocation rule \| hierarchy of diarchies \| indivisible good \| property right

freely available

Full text |

More access options

Check Google Scholar

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

More details

Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	MPRA Paper.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Classification:	D70 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making. General ; D61 - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008502740