(Almost) efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
Year of publication: |
2021
|
---|---|
Authors: | Blumrosen, Liad ; Dobzinski, Shahar |
Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 1002944-8. - Vol. 130.2021, p. 369-383
|
Subject: | Auctions | Bilateral trade | Budget balance | Double auctions | Mechanism design | Two-sided markets | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Auktion | Auction |
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