An efficient solution to the informed pricipal problem
Year of publication: |
2008
|
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Authors: | Severinov, Sergei |
Published in: |
Journal of economic theory. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531, ZDB-ID 410539-4. - Vol. 141.2008, 1, p. 114-133
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Subject: | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Informationsökonomik | Economics of information | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Theorie | Theory |
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