Announcements and Credibility of Monetary Policy.
An infinitely repeated monetary policy game a la R. Barro and D. Gordon (1983) is considered. Before the game starts the government announces a policy rule. If there is a slight probability that government is honest and a slight probability that the government makes mistakes, then a sufficiently patient government will have average loss close to its commitment loss in all sequentially rational equilibria of the infinitely repeated game. Copyright 1996 by Royal Economic Society.
Year of publication: |
1996
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Authors: | Schultz, Christian |
Published in: |
Oxford Economic Papers. - Oxford University Press. - Vol. 48.1996, 4, p. 673-80
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Publisher: |
Oxford University Press |
Saved in:
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