Are leniency programs too generous?

I present a simple model of collusion in which the competition authority offers leniency rates contingent on the number of firms that report information. The optimal leniency policy involves what I refer to as a single informant rule—that is, leniency should be given only when a single firm reports information. The single informant rule allows to increase expected sanctions compared to the first informant rule, which overall improves cartel deterrence.

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Year of publication:	2014
Authors:	Sauvagnat, Julien
Published in:	Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 123.2014, 3, p. 323-326
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Antitrust law and policy \| Cartels \| Leniency \| Informant rules

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	K42 - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law ; K21 - Antitrust Law ; L41 - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011041855