Are Tournaments Optimal Over Piece Rates Under Limited Liability for the Principal?
Year of publication: |
2012
|
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Authors: | Marinakis, Kosmas ; Tsoulouhas, Theofanis |
Publisher: |
[S.l.] : SSRN |
Subject: | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Theorie | Theory | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory |
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource (37 p) |
---|---|
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | In: International Journal of Industrial Organization Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments August 6, 2012 erstellt |
Other identifiers: | 10.2139/ssrn.932627 [DOI] |
Classification: | D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; D21 - Firm Behavior |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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