Asymmetric treatment of identical agents in teams
We investigate when identical agents will be treated asymmetrically in a simple team setting. Asymmetric treatment is optimal when the agents' individual contributions to team performance are strategic complements. Symmetric treatment of identical agents is optimal when the agents' contributions are strategic substitutes or when they are independent.
Year of publication: |
2010
|
---|---|
Authors: | Bose, Arup ; Pal, Debashis ; Sappington, David E.M. |
Published in: |
European Economic Review. - Elsevier, ISSN 0014-2921. - Vol. 54.2010, 7, p. 947-961
|
Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Subject: | Moral hazard Teams Asymmetric treatment |
Saved in:
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