Auction Design without Commitment

We study auction design when parties cannot commit to the mechanism. The seller may change the rules of the game any number of times and the buyers may choose their outside option at any stage of the game. A dynamic consistency condition and an optimality condition property are defined to characterize the seller's mechanism selection behavior. The unique stationary mechanism selection rule that meets the conditions is the English auction.

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Year of publication:	2009
Authors:	Vartiainen, Hannu
Publisher:	Turku : Aboa Centre for Economics (ACE)
Subject:	auctions \| commitment \| consistency \| one-deviation property \| stationarity

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Series:	Discussion paper ; 44
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/233260 [Handle] RePEc:tkk:dpaper:dp44 [RePEc]
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D44 - Auctions ; D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012502998