Bargaining over a Menu of Wage Contracts.
The authors investigate an infinite horizon bargaining problem in which a firm and a worker bargain over two dimensions: quality and wage. The worker has private information about his type. Only the uninformed firm makes an offer and it can offer a menu of quality-age contracts instead of a single one. They show that for all discount factors, the unique sequential equilibrium outcome is separating without delay; the firm separates the types of worker with a menu of contracts in the first period. The authors result shows that in multidimensional bargaining, the 'Coase Conjecture' holds in the sense that the game ends in the first period. But it fails in the sense that the uninformed party can preserve the entire bargaining power. Copyright 1998 by The Review of Economic Studies Limited.
Year of publication: |
1998
|
---|---|
Authors: | Wang, Gyu Ho |
Published in: |
Review of Economic Studies. - Wiley Blackwell, ISSN 0034-6527. - Vol. 65.1998, 2, p. 295-305
|
Publisher: |
Wiley Blackwell |
Saved in:
Online Resource
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
The comparison of entry deterrence between Cournot and Bertrand competition
Lee, Jinyoung, (2007)
-
On the economic incentives of CBP market in Korean electricity wholesale market
Wang, Gyu-ho, (2008)
-
The effect of bundling on the stable coalition in the composite goods market
Lee, Tae Eui, (2009)
- More ...