Bargaining over an endogenous agenda
Year of publication: |
2014
|
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Authors: | Anesi, Vincent ; Seidmann, Daniel J. |
Published in: |
Theoretical Economics. - New Haven, CT : The Econometric Society, ISSN 1555-7561. - Vol. 9.2014, 2, p. 445-482
|
Publisher: |
New Haven, CT : The Econometric Society |
Subject: | Bargaining | committee voting | evolving default | stable set |
Type of publication: | Article |
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Type of publication (narrower categories): | Article |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 10.3982/TE1318 [DOI] 89367642X [GVK] hdl:10419/150228 [Handle] RePEc:the:publsh:1318 [RePEc] |
Classification: | C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations ; D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior |
Source: |
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Bargaining over an endogenous agenda
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