Beat'Em Or Join'Em? Export Subsidies Versus International Research Joint Ventures in Oligopolistic Markets

This paper compares adversarial with cooperative industrial and trade policies in a dynamic oligopoly game in which a home and foreign firm compete in R&D and output and, because of spillovers, each firm benefits from the other's R&D. When the government can commit to an export subsidy, such a policy raises welfare relative to cooperation, except when R&D is highly effective and spillovers are near-complete.

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Year of publication:	1998
Authors:	Neary, J.P. ; O'Sullivan, P.
Institutions:	School of Economics, University College Dublin
Subject:	RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT \| TRADE POLICY \| EXPORTS \| SUBSIDIES \| OLIGOPOLIES

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Series:	College Dublin, Department of Political Economy-.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	32 pages
Classification:	O32 - Management of Technological Innovation and R&D ; D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; H20 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue. General
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005672069