Bidding Behavior in Asymmetric Auctions : An Experimental Study

We review an asymmetric auction experiment. Based on Plum (1992) private valuations of the two bidders are independently drawn from distinct but commonly known distributions, one of which stochastically dominating the other. We test the qualitative properties of that model of asymmetric auctions, in particular whether the weak bidder behaves more aggressively than the strong and then test bidders' preference for first- vs. second-price auctions

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Year of publication:	2017
Authors:	Güth, Werner ; Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta ; Wolfstetter, Elmar G.
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Experiment \| Auktionstheorie \| Auction theory \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (30 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	In: European Economic Review, 49: 187-192 (2005)
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.280599 [DOI]
Classification:	D44 - Auctions ; C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014126435