Bidding, negotiations and take-over prices
The authors argue that it is bargaining, not competition, which determines the way gains are distributed in take-over bids. Focusing on 'unfriendly' take-overs, where the target company's current management leaves, they show how bargaining and bidding interact to generate the take-over price and enable target shareholders to benefit most. Bargaining itself is influenced by the time-value of money, competition, financial strength and initial bargaining power.
Year of publication: |
1991
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Authors: | Van Hulle, Cynthia ; Sercu, Piet |
Published in: |
European Management Journal. - Elsevier, ISSN 0263-2373. - Vol. 9.1991, 2, p. 186-193
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Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Saved in:
Online Resource
Saved in favorites
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