Bilateral Comparisons and Consistent Fair Division Rules in the Context of Bankruptcy Problems
We analyze the problem of extending a given bilateral principle of justice to a consistent n-creditor bankruptcy rule. Based on the bilateral principle, we build a family of binary relations on the set of creditors in order to make bilateral comparisons between them. We find that the possibility of extending a specific bilateral principle of justice in a consistent way is closely related to the quasi-transitivity of the binary relations mentioned above.
Year of publication: |
1998-05-19
|
---|---|
Authors: | Volij, Oscar ; Dagan, Nir |
Published in: |
International Journal of Game Theory. - Springer. - Vol. 26.1997, 1, p. 11-25
|
Publisher: |
Springer |
Saved in:
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
Bilateral comparisons and consistent fair division rules in the context of bankruptcy problems
Dagan, Nir, (1994)
-
A non-cooperative view of consistent bankruptcy rules
Dagan, Nir, (1994)
-
A characterization of the Nash bargaining solution
Dagan, Nir, (2002)
- More ...