Binding promises and cooperation among strangers

In an experiment, a group of strangers was randomly divided in pairs to play a prisoners’ dilemma; this process was indefinitely repeated. Cooperation did not increase when subjects could send public messages amounting to binding promises of future play.

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Year of publication:	2013
Authors:	Camera, Gabriele ; Casari, Marco ; Bigoni, Maria
Published in:	Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 118.2013, 3, p. 459-461
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Coordination \| Cheap-talk \| Deception \| Repeated game \| Social norms

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	C90 - Design of Experiments. General ; C70 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. General ; D80 - Information and Uncertainty. General
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010688075