Bundling as a Facilitating Device: A Reinterpretation of Leverage Theory.
Tying-good monopolists that extract full consumer surplus from independent sales of their tying good may, nevertheless, choose to bundle in order to induce a favorable response by their tied-market rivals. In particular, bundling may facilitate supracompetitive prices for the tied good. Copyright 1991 by The London School of Economics and Political Science.
Year of publication: |
1991
|
---|---|
Authors: | Seidmann, Daniel J |
Published in: |
Economica. - London School of Economics (LSE). - Vol. 58.1991, 232, p. 491-99
|
Publisher: |
London School of Economics (LSE) |
Saved in:
Online Resource
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
A Theory of Gradual Coalition Formation.
Seidmann, Daniel J, (1998)
-
Seidmann, Daniel J, (1990)
-
Seidmann, Daniel J, (1995)
- More ...