Bureaucratic Advice and Political Governance
This paper studies the conflict of interest between politicians and better-informed bureaucrats when they have differing preferences over a public project. We start with a baseline model where a bureaucrat advises a single decision maker (politician) whether to adopt a project. The bureaucrat can be punished if his misrepresentation of the project is detected. We extend this to multiple projects and multiple bureaucrats, and compare the level of Type I and Type II errors generated with centralized and decentralized decision making. This typically depends on the form of the distribution function that determines the bureaucrats' expectation of being disciplined. Copyright © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc..
Year of publication: |
2008
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Authors: | BOADWAY, ROBIN ; SATO, MOTOHIRO |
Published in: |
Journal of Public Economic Theory. - Association for Public Economic Theory - APET, ISSN 1097-3923. - Vol. 10.2008, 4, p. 503-527
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Publisher: |
Association for Public Economic Theory - APET |
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