Buyouts in Large Companies.
We consider legal rules that determine the price at which minority shareholders can be excluded from the corporate enterprise after a change in control. These rules affect investment after such a change, as well as probability of the change itself. Our principal results are that minority shareholders should be given the value that their interest would have had were no later investment made and that this rule is best implemented in large companies by awarding the minority the preinvestment market value of their shares. The former aspect of our proposal is consistent with much current law but is rejected by many modern law reformers; the latter aspect of our proposal is novel. Copyright 1996 by the University of Chicago.
Year of publication: |
1996
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Authors: | Hermalin, Benjamin ; Schwartz, Alan |
Published in: |
The Journal of Legal Studies. - University of Chicago Press. - Vol. 25.1996, 2, p. 351-70
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Publisher: |
University of Chicago Press |
Saved in:
Saved in favorites
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