Categorical Segregation from a Game Theoretical Approach
This paper exploits a coalition formation game with incomplete information to illustrate the causal relationship between categorical thinking and segregation. This causality was suggested by Fryer and Jackson (2008). The present model shows how societies can be segregated even when its self-interested members have no a priori motivation to discriminate by social identity; consequently, this paper supports the argument that segregation may not be malevolent in origin.
Year of publication: |
2013
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Authors: | Rubi-Barcelo, Antoni |
Published in: |
Annals of Economics and Finance. - China Economics and Management Academy, ISSN 1529-7373. - Vol. 14.2013, 1, 6, p. 85-120
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Publisher: |
China Economics and Management Academy |
Subject: | Categorization | Segregation | Incomplete information | Cooperative games |
Saved in:
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