Categorization and correlation in a random-matching game
We consider a random-matching model in which every agent has a categorization (partition) of his potential opponents. In equilibrium, the strategy of each player i is a best response to the distribution of strategies of his opponents (when they face i) in each category of his categorization. We provide equivalence theorems between distributions generated by equilibrium profiles and correlated equilibria of the underlying game.
Year of publication: |
2010
|
---|---|
Authors: | Azrieli, Yaron |
Published in: |
Journal of Mathematical Economics. - Elsevier, ISSN 0304-4068. - Vol. 46.2010, 3, p. 303-310
|
Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Subject: | Random-matching Categorization Correlated equilibrium |
Saved in:
Online Resource
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
Azrieli, Yaron, (2021)
-
Azrieli, Yaron, (2021)
-
Constrained preference elicitation
Azrieli, Yaron, (2021)
- More ...