CEO Contracting and Antitakeover Amendments.
This article examines incentives for adopting antitakeover charter amendments (ATAs) that are associated with compensational contracts. The evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that antitakeover measures such as ATAs help managers protect above-market levels of compensation. Chief executive officers (CEOs) of firms that adopt ATAs receive higher salaries and more valuable option grants than CEOs at similar firms that do not adopt them. Furthermore, the magnitude of this difference increases following ATA adoption. The evidence is inconsistent with the hypothesis that ATAs facilitate the writing of efficient compensation contracts. Copyright 1997 by American Finance Association.
Year of publication: |
1997
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Authors: | Borokhovich, Kenneth A ; Brunarski, Kelly R ; Parrino, Robert |
Published in: |
Journal of Finance. - American Finance Association - AFA, ISSN 1540-6261. - Vol. 52.1997, 4, p. 1495-1517
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Publisher: |
American Finance Association - AFA |
Saved in:
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