CEO Duality and Firm Performance : Does Economic Policy Uncertainty Mediate the Relation?

Exploiting two exogenous shocks, we examine the relation between CEO-Chairman duality and firm performance. We report evidence that CEO duality benefits a firm when economic policy uncertainty is high. This implies that CEO-Chairman duality is an advantageous governance mechanism for coping with economic policy uncertainty. We show that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act reduced firm performance if a firm had separate leadership in 2001. However, this negative effect was mitigated if a firm had combined leadership in 2001. The results suggest that CEO duality is complementary to board independence and that the value of CEO duality is contingent on a firm's environment

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Year of publication:	2018
Authors:	Chang, Kiyoung
Other Persons:	Lee, Junyoup (contributor) ; Shim, Hyeongsop (contributor)
Publisher:	[2018]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Unternehmenserfolg \| Firm performance \| Führungskräfte \| Managers \| Wirtschaftspolitik \| Economic policy \| Risiko \| Risk

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (18 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	In: International Review of Finance, Forthcoming Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments April 13, 2018 erstellt
Classification:	G34 - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance ; D80 - Information and Uncertainty. General ; G18 - Government Policy and Regulation
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012921822