CFOs versus CEOs : Equity Incentives and Crashes

Using a large sample of U.S. firms for the period 1993-2009, we provide evidence that the sensitivity of a chief financial officer's (CFO) option portfolio value to stock price is significantly and positively related to the firm's future stock price crash risk. In contrast, we find only weak evidence of the positive impact of chief executive officer option sensitivity on crash risk. Finally, we find that the link between CFO option sensitivity and crash risk is more pronounced for firms in non-competitive industries and those with a high level of financial leverage

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Year of publication:	2011
Authors:	Kim, Jeong-Bon
Other Persons:	Li, Yinghua (contributor) ; Zhang, Liandong (contributor)
Publisher:	[2011]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Führungskräfte \| Managers \| Aktienoption \| Stock option \| Leistungsentgelt \| Performance pay \| Managervergütung \| Executive compensation \| Finanzkrise \| Financial crisis \| Leistungsanreiz \| Performance incentive

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (52 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	In: Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 101, pp. 713–730, 2011 Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments March 10, 2011 erstellt
Classification:	D89 - Information and Uncertainty. Other ; G12 - Asset Pricing ; G14 - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies ; G17 - Financial Forecasting ; G34 - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance ; M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects (stock options, fringe benefits, incentives, family support programs)
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013131966