Choix des produits : concurrence en qualité et en variété
A duopoly model encompassing both horizontal and vertical differentiation is analysed. We seek subgame perfect Nash equilibria in a game where firms choose, first, the horizontal (variety) and the vertical (quality) characteristics of their product and, then, compete in prices. We show that, whatever the products' characteristics, a price equilibrium exists. In the product selection stage, firms choose maximum differentiation along one of the characteristics and minimum differentiation along the other. When the quality range is broad enough relative to the variety range, firms choose the same variety but maximise differentiation in quality. Otherwise, they both choose the maximum quality but maximise their difference in terms of variety.
Year of publication: |
1989
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Authors: | NEVEN, Damien ; THISSE, Jacques-François |
Published in: |
Annales d'Economie et de Statistique. - École Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Admnistration Économique (ENSAE). - 1989, 15-16, p. 85-112
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Publisher: |
École Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Admnistration Économique (ENSAE) |
Saved in:
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