Coalition formation in the Airport Problem
We have studied the incentives of forming coalitions in the Airport Problem. It has shown that in this class of games, if coalitions form freely, the Shapley value does not lead to the formation of grand or coalitions with many players. Just a coalition with a few number of players forms to act as the producer and other players would be the consumers of the product. We have found the two member coalition which forms and we have checked its stability.
Year of publication: |
2009-03
|
---|---|
Authors: | Farrokhi, Mahmoud |
Institutions: | Institut für Mathematische Wirtschaftsforschung, Universität Bielefeld |
Saved in:
freely available
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
Coalition formation in the airport problem
Farrokhi, Mahmoud, (2009)
-
Coalition formation in the Airport Problem
Farrokhi, Mahmoud, (2009)
-
Coalition formation in the airport problem
Farrokhi, Mahmoud, (2009)
- More ...