Coalitionally strategyproof functions depend only on the most-preferred alternatives
Year of publication: |
1996-04-24
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Authors: | Mihara, H. Reiju |
Institutions: | EconWPA |
Subject: | Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem | dominant strategy implementation | social choice functions | infinitely large societies | tops only |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Notes: | Social Choice and Welfare (2000) 17: 393|402 |
Classification: | D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations ; C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C71 - Cooperative Games |
Source: |
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