Coarse Thinking and Collusion in Bertrand Duopoly with Increasing Marginal Costs
Mullainathan, Schwartzstein, & Shleifer [Quarterly Journal of Economics, May 2008] put forward a model of coarse thinking. The essential idea behind coarse thinking is that agents put situations into categories and then apply the same model of inference to all situations in a given category. We extend the argument to strategies in a game-theoretic setting and propose the following: Agents split the choice-space into categories in comparison with salient choices and then choose each option in a given category with equal probability. We provide an alternative explanation for the puzzling results obtained in a Bertrand competition experiment as reported in Abbink & Brandts [Games and Economic Behavior, 63, 2008]
Year of publication: |
2009-02-19
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Authors: | Siddiqi, Hammad |
Institutions: | Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München |
Subject: | Laboratory experiments | Oligopoly | Price competition | Co-ordination games | Coarse Thinking |
Saved in:
freely available
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Classification: | L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; C90 - Design of Experiments. General ; D83 - Search, Learning, Information and Knowledge ; D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; C72 - Noncooperative Games |
Source: |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005619772
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