Coase Contracts and the Producer's Incentive to Innovate.

The paper analyzes the dynamic efficiency of the Coase solution to the problem of negative externalities. We demonstrate that with respect to the incentive of the producer to develop or to adopt a superior technology the so-called "symmetry thesis" does not hold for all types of contracts.

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Year of publication:	1998
Authors:	Fritsch, M. ; Wein, T.
Institutions:	Fakultät Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Technische Universität Bergakademie Freiberg
Subject:	EXTERNALITIES \| CONTRACTS

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Series:	Bergakademie Freiberg, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	17 pages
Classification:	D60 - Welfare Economics. General ; K30 - Other Substantive Areas of Law. General ; O30 - Technological Change; Research and Development. General
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005675130