Collateral in banking policy: On the possibility of signaling
In this paper we study the validity of the assertion that collateral is in a position to signal the degree of borrowers’ riskiness. We use a framework in which the cash flow from the risky project is described by means of a continuous density and projects are classified by second-order stochastic dominance. We show that if collateral is assumed bounded by the initial project outlay the positive role of collateral, namely truthfully conveying the private information about the project risk by the collateral amount, can no longer be ensured.
Year of publication: |
2014
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Authors: | Bieta, Volker ; Broll, Udo ; Siebe, Wilfried |
Published in: |
Mathematical Social Sciences. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-4896. - Vol. 71.2014, C, p. 137-141
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Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Saved in:
Online Resource
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