Collateral vs. Project Screening: A Model of Lazy Banks
Year of publication: |
1998-11-01
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Authors: | Manove, Michael ; Padilla, A. Jorge ; Pagano, Marco |
Institutions: | Centro Studi di Economia e Finanza (CSEF) |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | Published in RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 32, No. 4, Winter, 2001 |
Classification: | D8 - Information and Uncertainty ; G2 - Financial Institutions and Services ; K2 - Regulation and Business Law |
Source: |
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