Collective relationship banking and private information monitoring in Korea
This paper introduces the notion of collective relationship banking (CRB) as a mechanism for monitoring private information and characterizes the probability of such a banking relationship existing when the borrowing firms have heterogeneous vertical ownership structures. Using a Korean firm-level panel dataset, the empirical results of the paper suggest that firms with smaller holding companies' ownership stakes are more likely to choose CRB. This can be explained in terms of CRB as a means to overcome informational asymmetries as holding companies can provide indirect monitoring. The paper then addresses policy concerns associated with corporate restructuring which may create a more concentrated banking relationship with a few dominant banks. Copyright (c) 2007 The AuthorJournal compilation (c) 2007 The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. .
Year of publication: |
2007
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Authors: | Chang, Yoonhee Tina |
Published in: |
The Economics of Transition. - European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). - Vol. 15.2007, 07, p. 483-504
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Publisher: |
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) |
Saved in:
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