Commitment and observability in a contracting environment
This paper examines leader-follower games where a leader must purchase an essential input from a price-setting supplier in order to take an action. We show that equilibrium outcomes when the followers perfectly observe the leaders' actions cannot be approximated by mixed equilibrium outcomes of the game where followers imperfectly observe the leaders' actions, i.e. they are not accessible. Accessibility fails since in a pure strategy equilibrium, a supplier makes positive profits; however in an equilibrium where a leader randomizes, supplier profits must be zero. Our result follows from a generalized indifference principle that mixed strategies must satisfy in economic environments. While supplier profits cannot be approximated, player action profiles are accessible. Our results also apply to games with costly observation.
Year of publication: |
2009
|
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Authors: | Bhaskar, V. |
Published in: |
Games and Economic Behavior. - Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256. - Vol. 66.2009, 2, p. 708-720
|
Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Keywords: | Commitment Imperfect observation Mixed strategies Pricing games |
Saved in:
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