Common Agency Games with Separable Preferences
Year of publication: |
2006
|
---|---|
Authors: | Andrea, Attar ; Piaser, Gwenäel ; Porteiro, Nicolas |
Institutions: | Dipartimento di Economia, Università Ca' Foscari Venezia |
Subject: | Revelation Principle | Common Agency | Separable Preferences |
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