Competition among mass media
This paper investigates how mass media provide information to readers or viewers who have diverse interests. The problem of a mass medium comes from the fact that there is a constraint on how much information can be delivered. It is shown that the mass medium optimally provides information that is somewhat useful to all agents, but not perfect to anybody in particular. This benchmark model is then used to investigate competition among mass media with differentiated products. In the equilibrium of the example studied, mass media differentiate their news fully, as if they were monopolies on the subset of readers to which they tailor their news. However, prices are disciplined by competition. <br><br> Keywords; mass media, product differentiation, news, cheap talk, quantization
Year of publication: |
2010-04-21
|
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Authors: | Kwiek, Maksymilian |
Institutions: | Economics Division, University of Southampton |
Saved in:
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