Competition between Nonprofit and For-Profit Firms

This paper considers a nonprofit firm competing against a for-profit firm in a homogenous goods market. Given a stochastic demand function and an asymmetric tax schedule, we derive Cournot-Nash equilibrium allowing the nonprofit firm to have an altruistic preference toward consumer surplus or total surplus. The effects of the tax rate and the degree of altruistic preference on market equilibrium outcomes are analyzed thereof.

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Year of publication:	2002
Authors:	Lien, Donald
Published in:	International Journal of Business and Economics. - College of Business, ISSN 1607-0704. - Vol. 1.2002, 3, p. 193-207
Publisher:	College of Business
Subject:	nonprofit \| asymmetric taxation \| stochastic demand \| Cournot-Nash equilibrium

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Extent:	application/pdf text/html
Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	L2 - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior ; L3 - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010837234