Competition to commit crime: An economic experiment on illegal logging using behavioral game theory

This study constructs an economic experiment using behavioral game theory to figure out policies that discourage illegal logging in Thailand. A player is assigned to be either a police or an outlaw in the game. The game randomly matches two players in different roles. The lawbreaker can offer a bribe to police under uncertainties whether the police may refuse it or reject the offer because of too small amount of the bribe. Even when bribery is accepted, it is still uncertain for an lawbreaker that he may be arrested afterwards. The study compares the decisions to give bribe and commit illegal logging in two scenarios. First, it compares the results between two regimes of incentives for police; high punishment with low reward versus low punishment with high reward. Second, it compares the decisions of an lawbreaker when he is independent to other lawbreakers and when he faces competitions among lawbreakers. Findings show that most of lawbreakers offer bribes to police. Lawbreakers under a competitive situation offer higher amount of bribe. Police tends to accept briberies and let the outlaws commit the logging. However, illegal logging is relatively discouraged when police is attracted by high arresting reward rather than suppressed by strong punishment for not arresting the lawbreakers. The study concludes that despite illegal logging is naturally attractive for lawbreakers especially in the competitive situation it can be discouraged by applying the incentive of high arresting reward to police.