Compliance signaling games : toward modeling the deterrence of insider threats
Year of publication: |
September 2016
|
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Authors: | Casey, William ; Morales, Jose Andre ; Wright, Evan ; Zhu, Quanyan ; Mishra, Bud |
Published in: |
Computational and mathematical organization theory. - Norwell, Mass. [u.a.] : Springer Science + Business Media, ISSN 1381-298X, ZDB-ID 1305080-1. - Vol. 22.2016, 3, p. 318-349
|
Subject: | Compliance | Signaling game | Evolutionary games | Agent based models | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Signalling | Evolutionäre Spieltheorie | Evolutionary game theory | Agentenbasierte Modellierung | Agent-based modeling | Normbefolgung | Legal compliance |
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